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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

villian and military factions, has decided not to make political concessions as a price for recognition by the United States.

The present disposition of the Dominican ruling groups is to stand firm on the refusal to do anything to speed the return to the democratic process beyond the original promise of general elections more than 2 years from now.

Although the three-man civilian junta in nominal control of the country appeared to be inclined last week to allow presidential and congressional elections perhaps before the end of 1964, it has now become clear that the powerful military-supported rightist groups would not tolerate even such a concession to win quicker recognition.

In fact, the Dominican rulers are taking the position that the country can go on indefinitely without Washington's recognition and U.S. economic aid. Both were suspended last September 24, when the military ousted President Bosch from the presidency after 7 months in office.

The Kennedy administration indicated at the time that diplomatic relations, aid under the Alliance for Progress and military assistance would remain suspended until at least a semblance of the democratic process returned to the Dominican Republic. Dr. Bosch was the Dominican Republic's first freely elected President in 36 years.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the basic alternatives for the United States is to refuse recognition indefinitely, in the hope of stimulating internal change, or to restore full relations on Dominican terms, which would imply a capitulation by the Kennedy administration.

TIES WITHOUT AID SUGGESTED

Some observers here believe, however, that the best solution would be a restoration of formal diplomatic relations, without a resumption of economic and military aid. Such a policy, these observers say, would maintain Washington's condemnation of the anti-Bosch coup, but at the same time would end what is becoming an untenable international situation.

Although the Dominican leadership has refused to make concessions as a price for recognition, its inability thus far in finding international acceptance is among the factors causing pressures from the rightist civilian and military groups that placed it in office.

The groups are also publicly finding fault with the leadership for its alleged failure to "eliminate Communists" from the administration and other sectors of national life. The reason given for the coup was that it would defend the country from communism.

Because the rightist groups' concept of what constitutes a Communist is extremely elastic, the Dominican leadership is increasingly faced with the choice of instituting a major purge—one that could lead to a breakdown of public administration—or finding itself replaced by a new, more repressive junta.

The leaders were criticized, in a letter published in local newspapers last week, for slowness in finding and ejecting Communists. The letter was from Dominican Independent Action, the civilian group principally responsible for pushing the military into the anti-Bosch coup.

A month after the end of the Dominican Republic's brief experiment in democracy, the country finds itself in the midst of growing confusion and dangers from both the right and the left. With rapid polarization, rightists as well as Communists and their allies are seeking to build up their forces for a showdown that many Dominicans fear may end in bloodshed.

GAINS SEEN BY UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, October 30.—The administration believes that its refusal to recognize the de facto regimes of the Dominican Republic

and Honduras is beginning to bear fruit.

The objective of this policy is to hasten the return to constitutional order in both countries.

U.S. officials reported today that the Dominican junta has indicated its willingness to negotiate the early restoration of democratic procedures.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM

MR. CHURCH. Mr. President, almost overnight, the political situation in South Vietnam has changed, and our policy toward the new government of that country will change accordingly. The U.S. Government—both the executive branch and the Congress—has, since the severe repression of the Vietnamese students and Buddhists by the Diem government this summer, hoped for the creation of an atmosphere in South Vietnam which might regather popular support behind the war effort.

I think that the President has followed the correct course in relation to South Vietnam. Although we have favored reforms, we have left it entirely to the will of the Vietnamese to implement that reform. If they themselves had not so strongly desired the change, we would have seen no coup in South Vietnam. My one regret about the recent coup was the violent death of Diem and Nhu, and all others who fell in the fight.

It will be no easy task to reestablish a stable and effective government in South Vietnam, a government which can rally the Vietnamese people to victory over the Communist Vietcong guerrillas. However, I hope we will share in helping the leaders of the new Vietnamese Government to successfully prosecute the war against the Communists, so that the many Americans there can come home again.

The effects of our policy in South Vietnam were well summarized in an article by Warren Unna which appeared in the November 5 issue of the Washington Post. I ask unanimous consent to have this excellent article printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BRIGHTER OUTLOOK: SAIGON COUP BOOSTS U.S. POLICY

(By Warren Unna)

The Kennedy administration's policy toward South Vietnam, despite all the cynical predictions of it being either nonexistent or negative, suddenly seems to emerge smelling like a rose.

As things stand now, South Vietnam even may lose its eligibility for becoming a whipping boy in next year's election campaign.

Last week's coup in Saigon accomplished two things:

1. South Vietnam gained a new government which now at least has a running chance of gaining the popular support needed not only to win the war against the Vietcong Communist guerrillas, but to keep the country stable enough to move forward once that war is won.

2. The United States which contributes \$1.5 million a day and some 16,500 military advisers toward helping South Vietnam in its war effort, managed to stand by its principles and encourage last week's coup without "playing God" and being its instigator.

As some of the Washington pundits observed, "CIA couldn't have been behind this; it worked too well."

More concrete proof of the U.S. innocence as instigator is the fact that one of the very key State Department officials concerned with South Vietnam was out of town at the time enrolling his children in school in the South.

The Kennedy administration's policy toward South Vietnam was not always so clean cut and decisive. Until last May, it was governed by the fear that if this country didn't coddle President Ngo Dinh Diem and his all-powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, these headstrong leaders might scuttle a war which the United States, with its interest in defending the whole of southeast Asia, was desirous of winning.

The Kennedy administration also did not want to scare off the Diem-Nhu regime's backing of a strategic hamlet program which the United States was convinced would give rural Vietnam the protection from the Vietcong and the sense of identification from a caring central government necessary to win the war.

But, according to one U.S. policymaker, May 8 became the turning point. This was the date of the first massacre of Buddhists by government troops in Hue.

From May 8 on, the Kennedy administration became increasingly aware that its old policy of placating Diem and Nhu would get nowhere. These changes followed:

Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., who was sent to South Vietnam with explicit instructions to appease Diem in the hopes of restoring his confidence in the United States, was called home for reassignment.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, a big-name politician known for his bluntness, was sent out with instructions to use his head and stand up for things he believed in.

Lodge did just that. He suggested that Nhu be relieved of his duties; he openly countered Mrs. Nhu's criticism of U.S. soldiers; and he put an end to all of Nolting's obsequious visits to the palace.

President Kennedy in an extraordinary Labor Day TV interview, called for "changes in policy and perhaps with personnel"—an explicit encouragement to the Vietnamese military leaders who at that time had come to the United States asking for support if they attempted a coup.

The military leaders called off that earlier coup attempt. But the Kennedy administration, on its own, proceeded to suspend two vital economic aid programs to South Vietnam and cut off the \$3 million a year the CIA had been paying special forces troops whose anti-Communist efforts Nhu had redirected against his own Buddhists.

The apparent assassination of both Diem and Nhu reportedly was not in the cards. The administration believes the coup leaders' assertion that they risked three costly hours at the height of the rebellion in holding their fire on the palace in the hope that Diem and Nhu would accept their guarantee of safe conduct out of the country.

But after the white flag was flown and the trucks wheeled into the palace to pick up Diem and Nhu the coup leaders found they had been duped and that the brothers had escaped.

Yesterday the U.S. Embassy in Saigon was instructed to convey Washington's disapproval of the brothers' deaths.

The Kennedy administration is well aware that there is no such thing as an ideal government in South Vietnam. But now at least the United States can hope for working out mutual problems with a sovereign government more representative of its people.

FUND TO HELP FINANCE EXPERT ASSISTANCE FOR INDIANS IN CASES BEFORE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, yesterday President Kennedy signed into law H.R. 3306, which establishes a fund

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